

JPRS 74695

3 December 1979

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2052



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74695	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT, No. 2052			5. Report Date 3 December 1979	
7. Author(s)			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
			14.	
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstract (Limit 200 words) This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political, and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.				
17. Document Analysis & Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-Arab Affairs	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Libya	<input type="checkbox"/> Sultanate of Oman	
Sociology	<input type="checkbox"/> North African	<input type="checkbox"/> Mauritania	<input type="checkbox"/> Syria	
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Affaires	<input type="checkbox"/> Morocco	<input type="checkbox"/> Tunisia	
Culture (Social Sciences)	<input type="checkbox"/> Afghanistan	<input type="checkbox"/> People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> United Arab Emirates	
Ethnology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Bahrain	<input type="checkbox"/> Persian Gulf Area	<input type="checkbox"/> Western Sahara	
Geography	<input type="checkbox"/> Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/> Qatar	<input type="checkbox"/> Yemen Arab Republic	
Techological	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Iran	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Saudi Arabia		
Military Sciences	<input type="checkbox"/> Iraq	<input type="checkbox"/> Spanish North Africa		
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Israel	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sudan		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Jordan			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Kuwait			
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lebanon			
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K, 15				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 56
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

3 December 1979

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2052

CONTENTS	PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS	
Report on Disagreements Among Arab Communist Parties (AL-DUSTUR, 8-14 Oct 79).....	1
Arab Borrowing and Investment Policies Analyzed (Adnan Karimah; AL-HAWADITH, 12 Oct 79).....	3
Briefs Joint Petrochemical Company	8
BAHRAIN	
Information Minister, Officials Comment on Gulf Security (AL-HAWADITH, 19 Oct 79).....	9
IRAN	
Kurdish Revolt Seen as Major Challenge to Khomeyni (Kiekie M. Ngebay; ELIMA, 11 Oct 79).....	16
ISRAEL	
Expansion of Settlements in Judaea, Samaria Urged (Editorial; HAZOFEH, 5 Oct 79).....	18
Establishment of New Rightist Party Scored (Amos Eylon; HA'ARETZ, 12 Oct 79).....	20
KUWAIT	
U.S. Plot Seen Behind Gulf Security Proposal (Editorial; AL-RAY AL-'AMM, 23 Sep 79).....	23

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Boycott Against American Goods Urged (Editorial; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 22 Sep 79).....	25
Shifting Alliances in Kuwait, Gulf Region Analyzed (Salim al-Lawzi; AL-HAWADITH, 26 Oct 79).....	27
LEBANON	
Statement of Maronite Patriarch Khuraysh (AL-SAFIR, 6 Oct 79).....	34
LIBYA	
Libyan Opposition Attacks Qadhdhafi Despotism (AL-JIHAD, Sep 79).....	36
Qadhdhafi Said Destroying Small Tradesmen (AL-JIMAD, Sep 79).....	40
Interview With Libyan Petroleum Secretary (Ezzedin Mabruk Interview; AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 15 Oct 79).....	41
SAUDI ARABIA	
Aid to Mali for Development, Islamic Activities Reported ('Abd-al-Muhsin al-Daud; AL-RIYAD, 3 Oct 79).....	43
PETROMIN Announced Aircraft Fuel Pipeline (AL-RIYAD, 11 Oct 79).....	47
Briefs Well, Pipeline Maintenance	49
SUDAN	
Khartoum Seeks Big Western Loan (AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 15 Oct 79).....	50
Briefs Arab Monetary Fund Loan	52

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Briefs

Resolution of Differences

53

REPORT ON DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ARAB COMMUNIST PARTIES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8-14 Oct 79 p 6

[Article: "The Lebanese Communist Party and Arab Communist Parties: Will Disagreements Become Critical?"]

[Text] It appears that the Fourth Conference of the Lebanese Communist Party did not go well, because in no time at all, party pamphlets were revealing the existence of disagreements within the organization which go back to earlier periods.

The group of Hasan Qaritam and Sawaya Sawaya, which is called the "Marxist-Leninist Platoons," announced that disagreements exist within the party and charged George Hawi with dictatorship, juvenile leftist adventurism, and hostility to the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.

In the pamphlet "Call of the People," which was distributed to newspapers, magazines, and news agencies, the Qaritam-Sawaya group added that George Hawi exploited the exceptional security conditions which prevail in the country to fabricate a "fourth conference" and appoint his own elements directly and through his control. He then staged an internal "overthrow" operation against Niqula al-Shawi, toppling him from the leadership of the general secretariat, and installed himself in his place. He gratified al-Shawi with an honorary position in order to turn aside resentment and contain a series of protests and objections.

The Communist Party has not yet replied to these "accusations," and it appears that the party leadership prefers silence to discussion with a group that was purged during preparation for the Second Conference (1968), which came immediately after the 5 June defeat.

The source of the Communist Party's fear of and aversion to issuing a reply is the existence of certain hidden relationships between the Sawaya-Qaritam group and some Arab communist parties which have complained about the criticisms of George Hawi.

It is worth mentioning that some of the Arab communist parties were alarmed by Hawi's recent statements and charged him with opportunism, a spirit of adventurism, and ostentatiousness at the expense of destroying the legacy and history of the other parties.

Some sources say that a certain amount of bloc formation has begun to manifest itself within the Arab communist movement to confront the divisive attitude of which George Hawi has been accused.

These sources add that some of the Arab communist parties (the group of Khalid Bakdash in Syria, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Jordanian Communist Party) have expressed their uneasiness about the haughty and pedagogical orientation which the Lebanese Communist Party has displayed toward them, especially on certain past and present political issues.

Moreover, it is likely that these disagreements will have serious repercussions on the regular meetings which the Arab communist parties organize from time to time. There is a real fear that the Arab communist movement will split into two wings, each with its own theories, positions, and practices.

8591

CSO: 4802

ARAB BORROWING AND INVESTMENT POLICIES ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Oct 79 pp 52-53

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "How Do the Arabs Borrow From Abroad?"]

[Text] When the United States--or to be exact, the American Commerce Department--announced that direct Arab investments represent 0.5 percent of total foreign investments, amounting to \$200 million out of a total of \$40 billion in 1978, it undoubtedly ignored numerous channels through which Arab money flows in to support the American economy.

For in addition to the profits and gains of American oil companies and other companies working in the Arab region, and the value of goods and services imported from the United States and paid for by area countries, there is a large influx of Arab funds into the various apparatuses which make up the American capital market. The funds enter this market through several direct and indirect channels.

Without entering into a discussion of just how correct the American Commerce Department's figure is, we will content ourselves with presenting estimates of investments by OPEC countries. These estimates indicate that OPEC investments as of the end of last year totaled approximately \$168 billion, of which \$150 billion belonged to the Arab oil-producing states.

These investments appear in three channels, with the lion's share going to the United States.

--Through the first channel, various financial and direct investments totaling \$42 billion flowed into the United States. But though this estimate is confirmed by the American Treasury Department, the U.S. General Accounting Office's estimate is higher by more than \$10 billion, putting the figure at \$53 billion. This sum is distributed as follows: \$3.9 billion in shares, \$12.4 billion in Treasury bonds, \$3.6 billion in nontransferrable certificates of deposit, \$12.2 billion in deposits in American banks, and \$19.8 billion in deposits in foreign branches of American banks.

--The second channel consists of financial investments in international markets amounting to \$60 billion. The American economy benefits from these funds through American and non-American financial and banking institutions which trade in the American capital market.

--The third channel carries financial and direct investments into other industrialized states. The American economy also benefits from these investments through its institutions which operate in these states and trade in their markets.

Despite their small volume in relation to total foreign investments in the United States, direct Arab investments in that country are considerably higher, experts estimate, than Arab financial investments in the Arab states themselves. This has been the basis for complaints about the failure of Arab capital to flow into those states and the lack of participation of these funds in Arab development as required, to the extent that countries needing loans turn to institutions in the international market to obtain them, in some cases borrowing the very funds they have on deposit in foreign banks.

Statistics issued by the International Bank, which also appear in a publication by Morgan Guaranty Trust, indicate that total Arab borrowing in the international market during the past 7 years amounted to \$16.5 billion. This falls into two categories:

The first category encompasses loans made in the international bond markets by foreign institutions for the benefit of Arab borrowers, amounting to a total of about \$1.5 billion during the past 7 years. Algeria was the largest borrower, alone accounting for about 80 percent of the total, or \$1.187 billion. Next came Morocco with \$136 million in loans, followed by Tunisia with \$83 million and the UAE with \$42 million. Even Saudi Arabia had a share in these loans, amounting to \$10 million, and Lebanon obtained a loan of \$5 million.

The second category takes in public and private Arab loans in the international bank loan market, which were in the form of collective bank loans with a variable interest rate. During the past 7 years, such loans amounted to about 14 billion dollars, which was allocated to finance specific projects and to cover deficits in balance of payments accounts, regular budgets, and development budgets.

Arab experts are of the opinion that this figure includes only those lending operations which are publicized, since the details of the conditions of many loans granted in this market are surrounded by a certain amount of secrecy on the part of Arab banks, and in the majority of cases are not made public at the request of the borrowers themselves. For this reason, these experts estimate that the true total of Arab borrowing in the international bank lending market was not less than \$15 billion during the specified period.

Algeria again occupied first place with regard to this type of loan, with borrowings of about \$6 billion, followed by the UAE with \$2.5 billion, Morocco with \$2.2 billion, and Iraq with \$680 million. Ranked fifth was Egypt with \$605 million, followed by Qatar with \$450 million, Tunisia with \$325 million, Sudan with \$302 million, Lebanon with \$271 million, and, finally, Saudi Arabia with \$265 million.

Although Arab borrowing in international markets, whether through bonds or bank loans, jumped from \$215 million in 1972 to \$1.65 billion at the end of 1978, this increase was in keeping with the general trend in all Third World states, whose borrowing in general on international markets rose greatly--especially following the oil price increase in 1973. The volume of these loans increased from \$3 billion in 1972 to more than \$41 billion in 1978. The total amount of Third World loans during the past 7 years was about \$114 billion. Thus Arab borrowing represented some 14 percent of total borrowing by Third World states.

To indicate the role of the American financial and banking institutions through which international bank loans are made to Arab borrowers, we can make use of figures for 1978 which refer to 30 mixed foreign and Arab institutions from among the most important international financial institutions which managed Arab loans. Three institutions had the lion's share, accounting for approximately \$1.4 billion out of the \$3.8 billion which made up the total of all lending operations by the 30 institutions. These three institutions were the Bank of America with \$546 million, City Corporation with \$449 million, and Toronto-Dominion Bank with \$392 million.

A positive point to the advantage of the Arabs, though in a negative form, must be pointed out here. Statistics for 1978 indicate that Arab and joint Arab-European institutions managed \$1.2 billion, or 32 percent, of the total funds on loan. This is an impressive percentage, and Arab experts see it as the start of real participation by Arab financial institutions in securing a portion of the reserves of Arab borrowers through their organizations and at competitive rates. This does not mean, however, that these institutions have taken this amount into their own individual lending portfolios; rather they have sold a significant portion of the loans to other foreign institutions--a fact which arises from their restricted capacities to absorb large volumes of Arab loans into their own portfolios, either presently or in the future, due to their limited capital. For, as is widely known, there are specified ratios which must be maintained between a bank's capital and its total portfolio of loans in accordance with the principles of sound international banking operations.

All of these facts about channels of Arab capital, expressed with true exactness by the figures, are closely heeded by Arab experts. Studies by the ton have been produced on the necessity of adopting the required measures to ensure that this capital is made to flow in Arab channels, so that it can take part in developing the economy of the Arab homeland. The latest of

these studies is a report prepared by a committee of experts commissioned by the Council of Directors of Arab Central Banks. This report, entitled "Methods of Developing the Arab Financial Market," was discussed by the directors at their last meeting, which took place on 24 September of this year in Tripoli West, Libya.

The report states in its introduction: "Visible trends indicate that the coming decade will put Arab region up against a unique and unprecedented challenge. On the one hand, we find that the main Arab oil-producing countries will amass vast and uninterrupted financial revenues, even after covering the financing requirements of their local development objectives, and that these revenues must be invested to generate a permanent source of income, in view of the fact that the oil source is exhaustible. On the other hand, we find that foreign financial revenues will continue to play a primary role in spurring the development and investment potential of the other Arab states and in making a success of their efforts to improve the living standard of their citizens.

"Therefore," the report continues, "The great challenge which the Arab region will face in the coming decade has become possible through enlisting a long-range investment strategy which will achieve in practical terms a deep-rooted conformity among the interests of both the Arab oil-producing states and the Arab states which need capital."

However, as the experts point out in their report: "This matter requires concentrated efforts to overcome problems connected with the aid, which limits the capacity of the Arab region to absorb new investments generated by oil assets. This means providing the capability to use financial aid obtained on easy terms, as well as the capacity to attract financing offered on a competitive commercial basis through Arab financial markets in a way that will put existing investments policies in the Arab region in order--even though they participate with or compete with similar policies outside the area in attracting Arab oil revenues available for investment."

Such a concept, in the view of the experts, makes the role of the financial markets a truly important one with regard to working to increase the volume and effectiveness of private and public capital flows within the Arab region on a commercial basis.

Absorption capacity is one of four things which the experts described as fundamental to the development of a financial market, the other three being:

1. Financial apparatus and institutions.
2. Freedom of movement of funds.
3. An investment climate.

The last item is perhaps the most important, and lack of confidence in the Arab climate is undoubtedly one of the main reasons that Arabs have resorted to investing their assets abroad.

In view of the fact that the investment issue has now begun to transcend the limits of individual initiatives and reach the heart of the official policy of the two parties to an investment--noting that the majority of Arab assets are government assets--the movement of Arab assets so that they will end up in the various countries which make up the Arab economy requires, as the experts state in their report, that the investment climate be characterized by a certain level of confidence, clarity, and stability, making possible the implementation of integrated and large-scale investment programs. Since the majority of Arab assets belong to the government, this lends a political character--to investment decisions--a fact which dictates that a minimum level of coordination be created among the various financial and investment policies of the different parties.

This means that what is required is, firstly, Arab political decisions at the level of heads of state and kings in order to save Arab capital from suffering a decline in value abroad, and secondly, the utilization of this capital to strengthen the Arab economy.

Adding to the need for making such decisions is the fact that the pressures which surround Arab assets, and the blocs formed or remarks circulated on account of them abroad, have turned an appropriate investment climate within the Arab homeland into a pan-Arab and national responsibility which is indispensable if Arabs are to maintain these assets and enable them to escape the fate which may be planned for them.

In this connection, the Arab experts, in the report they made to the directors of the Arab central banks, warned against any relaxation or carelessness, "for with the passage of time and an increase in investment activities outside the Arab homeland, we will reach a position where Arab investment comes closer to being a weapon against the Arab investors themselves--especially since nationalization, seizure, and asset-freezing operations by various states abroad are no longer unexpected events."

Do Arab politicians at the highest levels perceive the responsibility thrust on their shoulders and the challenge awaiting them in the 1980's as their experts perceive them? Will they be able to settle their deep-seated and persistent differences in order to unify their positions vis-a-vis their fateful problems, including the problem of maintaining their countries' wealth?

Despite the fact that hope is slim, we must repeat the proverb which says: "How narrow life would be, were it not for the ampleness of hope!"

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

JOINT PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY--'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifa, amir of the State of Bahrain, met with [Kuwaiti] Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah yesterday. It has been learned from a responsible source in al-Manamah that 'Ali Sabah had sent the amir of Bahrain a message from his highness the amir dealing with recent developments of common concern which have occurred in the Gulf area. Meanwhile, Kuwait and Bahrain signed an agreement yesterday for the establishment of a Kuwaiti-Bahraini petrochemicals company. The agreement was signed on behalf of Kuwait by Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifa al-Sabah, who arrived in al-Manamah 2 days ago. Signing for Bahrain was Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi. The capitalization of the company was not immediately announced. However, a Bahraini source said that the volume of investments for the establishment of projects related to the company is 140 million Bahraini dinars (about \$420 million). After the signing of the agreement founding the company, which will be called the Kuwaiti-Bahraini Petrochemicals Company, the two ministers expressed their hope that the venture will be the start of other joint projects which will help support the economic and industrial projects which exist between the two countries. The president of the Kuwaiti Petrochemicals Company, 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Nuri, said that the new company will produce basic inputs for subsequent phases of the petrochemicals industry through exploitation of natural gas, which is found in Bahrain in large quantities. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 23 Sep 79 p 7] 8591

CSO: 4802

INFORMATION MINISTER, OFFICIALS COMMENT ON GULF SECURITY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 19 Oct 79 pp 27-30

[Interview with the information minister and other officials in Bahrain by Salim Al-Lawzi: "Is Ayatollah Ruhani an Agent of the Shah or of Shaykh 'Isa?"]

[Text] Early this week, the Bahraini ambassador presented his credentials to the government in Tehran. Could that have been the happy ending of the Iranian tempest which has struck Bahrain? We single out Bahrain, because the Kuwaiti authorities do not believe that the Iranian threat included Kuwait. The action taken by Kuwait's Interior Ministry in which 17 members of the Mahri family--in-laws of Ayatollah Khomeyni--have been stripped of their Kuwaiti nationality is seen in Kuwait as nothing more than a legal action dealing with an ordinary violation of local laws and putting a firm end to it.

The attempt to minimize the significance of what has happened in Kuwait is undoubtedly a clever policy. In Bahrain, this policy is paralleled by the policy typified by the old saying "Put away a problem before it puts you away" [i.e. pre-emptive action]. The Bahraini authorities have successfully contained the tempest stirred up by Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani, the self-styled leader of the Bahraini revolution dedicated to the overthrow of the regime of Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman. Indeed, the authorities in Bahrain have even managed to utilize the tempest to their own benefit and to reap its fruits on the domestic, pan-Arab and international levels.

Was the tempest contrived and sham or was it simply the result of impulsive actions? And if it is sham, who is it that contrived it? And who has enlarged it and magnified it into an event that has rocked the region and sent ripples through the waters of the Gulf for the last 4 weeks?

The story had an ordinary beginning. A number of Shi'ite dignitaries in Bahrain traveled to Iran to offer their congratulations on the triumph of the Islamic revolution there. The group was led by Muhammad 'Ali al-Qa'ri, a former Bahraini official-turned-imam who has been badgering the authorities to prohibit alcohol, ban mixed employment of men and women, forbid the

employment of women in public service and abolish the teaching of music. While in Tehran, the Bahraini dignitaries had a meeting with Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani who urged them to emulate what the Iranians had done against the shah's regime. By sheer coincidence, the Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak was visiting the Sultanate of Oman at the time, where he read the remarks made by Ayatollah Rouhani and the fierce Iraqi reply which warned that Iran's fingers would be chopped off if they meddled in any Arab part of the Gulf. Mubarak found it a propitious opportunity to declare that Egypt was prepared to stand by any Arab country facing an external threat and remark that "the Iranian threats against Bahrain imperil the security of the Gulf and should be confronted firmly and strongly, and Egypt is prepared to discuss Bahrain's self-defense needs."

The Egyptian official's statements roused the region and kept it simmering. In successive actions, Saudi Arabia declared that it was prepared [to help Bahrain], the Kuwaiti prime minister and crown prince contacted Bahrain's crown prince to tell him that Kuwait was prepared to send troops, and the prime minister of Bahrain, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Salman, took with him a number of ministers and flew to Saudi Arabia for urgent talks with the Saudi crown prince.

Amid this commotion, the AFP flashed a report which made the front pages of newspapers in Europe, America, the Arab capitals and the Gulf. Briefly, the AFP reported that Saudi forces had suddenly arrived in Bahrain and taken up positions in strategic locations to deal with any emergency. The AFP attributed the report to Iranian opposition sources in Paris in what seems to be an allusion to the Bakhtiar faction. On the same day, it was announced that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia would be visiting Libya, at a time when the deputy premier of Iran was accusing Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi of having spirited away Imam Musa al-Sadr [Lebanese Shi'ite leader] and holding him responsible for al-Sadr's disappearance.

As those and other events and developments continued to unfold in rapid succession, it appeared as if the battle between the Sunnis and Shi'ites and the Arabs and Persians has begun. This feeling was augmented by a statement in which the new Iranian defense minister Dr Mostafa Shamran announced that the Iranian fleet has begun naval maneuvers in the Gulf and that land and aerial maneuvers will be conducted shortly because an Arab state in the region is openly threatening Iran. He said that the government in Iran wanted to demonstrate its ability to defend itself against any possible external military attack.

These reports continued to escalate for 4 days. After that came a torrent of counter-statements which contained more confirmation than denial. The AFP carried a statement by Bahrain's information minister Dr Tariq al-Mu'ayyid which was published in the English-language newspaper GULF MIRROR. Dr al-Mu'ayyid said that military visits between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia

were continuing. Asked about the military support offered by Husni Mubarak, President al-Sadat's deputy, Dr al-Mu'ayyid said that the Saudis, in their capacity as the nearest and dearest, are more entitled to come to Bahrain's aid. It was then the turn of Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa, Bahrain's crown prince and defense minister, to announce that there were no Arab forces in Bahrain "at present" and that the prime minister of Bahrain had gone to Saudi Arabia to discuss the security situation in the Gulf.

Interestingly enough, Amir Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi defense minister, said at a private gathering in Geneva which included a number of journalists: "...The kingdom has not sent forces to Bahrain, but we stand ready to send Bahrain anything that it needs. When we invited the Gulf heads of state to Khamis Mushayt in July to watch the Saudi Army's military maneuvers, the message behind our invitation was that the Saudi Army is their army, too." However, news agencies have failed to carry Amir Sultan's statement and no paper has published it.

Was there an intention, a plan or an "imperialist plot" behind the escalation of tension in the Gulf area, or was this hullabaloo merely the result of a competition among news agencies to score a scoop?

I went to see Bahraini Information Minister Tariq al-Mu'ayyid and put to him the following question: Was the ambiguity in your press statements intended? The minister was taken aback by the question. He adjusted his glasses with his right hand, sat upright and said: "Intended? By whom?" "By you," I said.

[Answer] If there is any intent, then the news agencies are to blame. They have been recently carrying many statements which have been distorted or slanted to serve certain purposes. Regrettably, our press in the Gulf was carrying the statements and information reported by foreign news agencies without first verifying them or contacting the source to check their veracity.

[Question] What are those certain purposes which you impute to the foreign news agencies?

[Answer] To create the impression that there is an atmosphere of tension in the region, whereas all the statements concerned were emphasizing that what has happened was nothing more than a summer cloud.

[Question] If it was merely a summer cloud, as you say, why then the military preparations, statements, visits and affirmations of Arab solidarity, and why was discussion of the Gulf security issue renewed?

[Answer] By a summer cloud, I mean to describe the events which took place in Bahrain. There were those who wanted to exaggerate the significance of those events to create the impression that we have internal problems. As for external issues, foreign ambitions are nothing new to us. What is new, however, are the statements and counter-statements which are not reassuring with regard to foreign intentions. The states of the Gulf found it propitious, therefore, to reaffirm their solidarity and re-emphasize their determination to defend themselves against any attempt at sabotage or aggression....

[Question] External aggression?

[Answer] Of course. We can handle internal aggression.

[Question] (I found it a good opportunity to present to the minister--who has lost 2 kilograms of weight in the past 2 months--some current press information, so I said:) Is it true that Amir Fahd (Saudi Arabia's crown prince and strongman) has asked the Bahraini delegation which visited him under the leadership of Shaykh Khalifah, the prime minister, to pay a visit to Baghdad?

[Answer] (The minister, who was now slouching in his seat, sat up again). All that I can say on this subject is that Iraq has a role to play in this region. Both the Saudi and Bahraini governments believe in the importance of that role. We cannot exclude Iraq from any moves made by the Gulf states.

[Question] Why then have you asked Syria to act as a mediator between you and Khomeyni?

[Answer] We have received messages of support from a number of Arab states, while other Arab states issued official and unofficial statements in which they said that they stand with us against any threat. This indicates that Arab solidarity is a basic fact and that all the Arab states would not allow any foreign interference in Bahrain's affairs. The fact of the matter is that there are no problems between us and Imam Khomeyni or the Iranian government. All that there is is that some men of religion in Iran have made provocative statements which were magnified by the media beyond their real significance.

[Question] I asked you about the Syrian mediation....

[Answer] It was the media which described the good offices made by President Hafiz al-Asad as a mediation effort. We are grateful for such efforts.

[Question] Don't you believe that the contrived dispute with Iran has dragged you into the ring of the Syrian-Iraqi struggle over influence?

[Answer] (The minister stood up, lit up a Havana cigar and said:) I don't wish to answer this question. In any case, I am not qualified to answer it.

The exaggeration of events, distortion of position and overstatements which the Bahraini minister of information has blamed on foreign news agencies are considered by Kuwaiti officials to be a symptom of the informational cancer in the Kuwaiti press. When I asked a senior Kuwaiti official about the nature of the Syrian mediation, he immediately said: A Syrian mediation? We are not a party to the dispute with Iran. The recent verbal onslaught was directed against Bahrain. Iran has not advocated the annexation of Kuwait, as some Iranian men of religion have done with regard to Bahrain, nor has anyone in Kuwait offered to lead an Islamic revolution against the regime, as Ruhani has offered to do in Bahrain.

I clutched a number of morning papers which were lying on the desk of the senior Kuwaiti official and said: These are Kuwaiti papers. It is these papers which labeled the Syrian endeavors a "mediation" effort. Here is a frontpage headline which reads: "A Syrian Mediation Between Kuwait and Bahrain and Iran." Here is a headline in another paper: "Success of the Syrian Mediation Between Kuwait and Bahrain and Iran." And here are similar headlines in the other papers. The entire Kuwaiti press agrees on calling it a mediation effort. The senior Kuwaiti official was irked--annoyance has become quite common among officials and nonofficials in the Gulf nowadays--and said: You come from abroad where you sit in London and read the Kuwaiti papers, and you imagine that things are as news agencies and some journalists writing in these papers have painted them to be. Anyone who lives abroad and reads Kuwaiti newspapers will imagine that the world has gone topsy-turvy in our country. The newspapers here write all kinds of hodgepodge.

He ruffled through the heap of newspapers sitting on his desk and said: Each newspaper weighs a kilogram, but most of what is written here is sheer nonsense and gibberish. I told him: This is not unusual. Pardon my saying so, but the oil press is indeed a sort of informational cancer, as you have described it. When there is a competition among your papers, with each paper trying to outstrip the others in number of pages, when the number of professional journalists is far less than what is required and when this phenomenon spreads throughout the Gulf region, then don't expect the press here to measure up to the standard which you desire.

A similar remark was made to me by Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa, the Bahraini crown prince and defense minister!

[Question] I have read a statement attributed to you by the GULF NEWS AGENCY in which you comment on reports that two Saudi brigades have arrived in Bahrain by saying that there are no Arab forces in Bahrain at present. The words "at present" could mean that there were forces in the past. I personally heard in Kuwait that Saudi national guard forces were dispatched to Bahrain on 'Id al-Fitr following a pro-Khomeyni demonstration.

[Answer] (Laughingly) God forgive the press and members of the press. They have mixed up my statements with those of brother Tariq (al-Mu'ayyid, the minister of information).

[Question] Ayatollah Ruhani has not yet corrected the press statements he has made in Tehran and has not said that the statements were distorted. Otherwise, the tempest which has struck the Gulf and kept it reeling was a tempest in a thimble, not even in a teacup.

[Answer] On the contrary, he has confirmed his statements. This has prompted the Iranian ambassador in Paris (Shams al-Din Amiralai) to accuse him of being an agent of the shah and to say that he has in his possession files and documents to prove that.

[Question] Would you allow me to correct the Iranian ambassador in Paris?

[Answer] Please do.

[Question] I believe that Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani is an agent of Bahrain, and who knows he may be connected with Mr Henderson of the intelligence department.

(Before Shaykh Hamad could snap out of the astonishment which showed on his face, I went on:) I don't know to what extent this Iranian tempest which has struck Bahrain has been engineered and orchestrated, and to what extent it has been caused by impulsion, emotion and haphazardness. I also cannot judge to what extent foreign news agencies have been responsible for exaggerating events, distorting statements and planting information. Those news agencies are, in fact, steeped in the arts of psychological manipulation. But I can tabulate for your highness the domestic, Arab and international gains garnered by Bahrain as a result of the statements made by Ayatollah Sadiq Rouhani. On the domestic front, all that was needed to turn the issue in Bahrain into one of Arabism versus non-Arabism was a call by an Iranian man of religion to lead an Islamic revolution in Bahrain to overthrow the regime. Indeed, the Sunnis and Shi'ites banded together in a show of solidarity and said in effect: We may have objections to and claims against the regime, but the regime should remain an Arab one, and no non-Bahraini should be allowed to interfere in our affairs. On the Arab front, Bahrain has reaped endless gains. The Arab states, especially the Gulf states, have all lined up on Bahrain's side. Thanks to the tempest, what al-Sadat called "an Iraqi-Saudi axis in the Gulf area" has come true. The Iranian tempest has enabled Iraq to enter the Gulf states' club as a full-fledged and accepted--indeed, sought after--member. On the global front, one has only to scan foreign newspapers and news agency reports to realize that Bahrain enjoyed an unlimited world sympathy.

(I went on tongue-in-cheek: Frankly, I considered the idea of using Shaykh Ryuhani to threaten AL-HAWADITH and offer to lead an Islamic revolution against it, in the hope of getting even a small part of the gains you, in Bahrain, have gotten.

Next morning, I was at the majlis [public council] of Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman, the ruler of Bahrain, at his palace in Al-Rifa'. It was natural that the conversation at the gathering should revolve around the Khomeyni revolution, the various ayatollahs and their statements and pronouncements and the impact of all that on the Shi'ite Arabs in the Gulf. A Bahraini dignitary said quietly: Even in Iran, the other sects do not practice their rites as they do here in Bahrain. The Shi'ites here have their own separate waqfs [religious endowments] department as the Sunnis do. They have Ja'farite courts separate from the Sunnis courts. In the realm of personal statute, inheritance procedures follow the Ja'farite doctrine. In fact, there are special educational centers which fall under the jurisdiction of the Ja'farite guidance department.

It seems that the amir caught part of the talk which was whispered in my ear, for his face suddenly darkened--a rare occurrence--and he slammed the table with his little hand. Then he said: I do not allow in my council any talk about Sunnis or Shi'ites. The secret of Bahrain's progress is that it is a society of coexistence based on equal sharing. Competition is, therefore, creative and constructive rather than destructive, and the spirit which prevails is that of a closely knit family. One's first loyalty is to Bahrain, after that each person is free to practice his beliefs and rites.

Calm returned to the amir's gentle face, and he went on: Allegiance to Bahrain is above allegiance to anything else. The question of a majority and a minority is not a valid one, and anyone who raises this issue is a saboteur working against the Shi'ites and the Sunnis alike.

I have known Shaykh 'Isa for more than 10 years, but I have never heard him talk with the confidence and clarity with which he talked that day. As I was leaving the amir's majlis, I told Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Rashid, undersecretary of the Information Ministry: How munificent are the noble deeds of Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani: I don't know what interest you have in quelling the tempest he has whipped up when it continues to lavish all those bounties on you.

9254

CSO: 4802

IRAN

KURDISH REVOLT SEEN AS MAJOR CHALLENGE TO KHOMEYNI

Kinshasa ELIMA in French 11 Oct 79 pp 1, 7

[Article by Kiekie M. Ngebay: "Who will Plead for the Kurds?"]

[Text] The smell of gunpowder continues to tickle the nostrils of the inhabitants of Iran, which for some time now has been one of the hot spots of our world.

A glance at the overall situation in Iran makes it apparent to any observer that the unity and harmony that existed between the forces of the country which had led the struggle against the shah's regime, no longer exist today. Indeed, each faction or political movement is struggling to promote its own program.

It is difficult to have a precise idea of the divisions within the political forces of Iran. The religious communities certainly form the strongest political groups, although that does not prevent differing points of view between them on the sociopolitical makeup of Iran.

National minorities have become the No 1 problem, which in turn has become part of a broader problem: that of the rights to be given to a people which had been deprived of its rights and, consequently, one of the central problems of the Islamic Republic created by the Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The national minorities, which had been politicized during the struggle against the shah's regime, just as all other Iranians, are acting together in order to wage a more effective battle for their rights. This concerted action is, up to a point, facilitated by the fact that unlike the other Iranians, the minorities all belong to the Sunnite sect.

That, under the present conditions in Iran, is very important. Iran, in a general way, seems to be a multinational state. There are said to be 10 million Azerbaijani (who are related to the Turks), 3 million Kurds, 2 million Arabs (in Khuzestan), 1 million Baluchis, 700,000 Turkmen.

But present events in Iran are dominated by the problem of the Kurds, a problem which is considered very delicate. The Kurds, living in compact groups in countries bordering on Iran, are taking action to gain Kurdish autonomy.

The demand for autonomy could develop into a demand for the formation of an independent Kurdish state. That explains the renewal of guerrilla activity and terrorism in Kurdistan, and that is taking place in spite of all the measures taken by the Bazargan government to stem the tide of violence.

In Kurdistan then, the skirmishes between the Kurdish warriors and the guardians of the revolution are increasing. The governor of the province in question has explained that the "small degree of security in the region, despite the presence of the army, is due to a lack of receptivity on the part of the population;" the army is seen as a spearhead of the Ayatollah Khomeyni and the population demands its withdrawal.

The problem of the minorities is, from all appearances, very delicate and difficult to resolve. The present leaders of Iran are carefully trying to decide what to do under the present circumstances under which rebellion is growing in Kurdistan.

8956

CSO: 4900

EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS IN JUDAEA, SAMARIA URGED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 5 Oct 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Land for Settlers in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Text] The settlers in 'Ofra evacuated the hill near their settlement as demanded by the IDF command. They said in advance that they would avoid any clash with the soldiers. But a serious problem still exists. This settlement, like the other settlements in Judaea and Samaria, needs additional land like air for breathing. This demand has been heard for a long time and the government promised to respond to their needs. Moreover, at a meeting between the minister of defense and the representatives of the NRP, which was held several days ago, the minister promised to submit the positive conclusion to the ministerial committee for approval. In the meantime, he reneged on his promise, saying that the timing was not right for expropriation of private land, which could evoke serious repercussions in the international political arena. He transferred the matter to the government for a debate and decision.

The government's fundamental policy on settlement in Judaea and Samaria has loyal executors and they demand that growth and development in areas, which meet their needs, be made possible for them. Since this concerns settlement pioneers, who have been waiting for the fulfillment of the promises for a long time, they must not be disappointed with constant delays based on the argument that the timing was inappropriate and that there was opposition to the expropriation of private land. Those who made the promises knew all this in advance.

What are the real chances for expanding the areas of the Elqana, Bet Horon, Ofra, Giv'on, Efrat, Qadum and Kiryat Arba settlements? The spokesmen of the settlements demonstrate that subsistence areas, without which it is literally impossible to exist [second part of sentence illegible]. The Arabs are closing on them with their buildings and farms on all sides, a planned and deliberate closing. Time is against the settlers. Expansion has become a very urgent need.

The choice is between expropriation, which involves a special law and may lead to appeals, and the localization of certain settlements on areas where there is government land. This is a practical decision with political

implications involving the future of settlement in Judaea and Samaria. It should be noted that not only the Arabs are against this settlement, not only the Americans object to it, but most of the opposition uses it to gore the government. The left wages a campaign of slander and provocation against it.

The settlers, stubborn pioneers, who planted their settlements on bald mountains and stony ground in order to settle the land of Judaea and Samaria, the first of the thousands that will follow them, will continue to fight for their right to establish their homes here without the choking pressure of a ghetto in the land of Israel. They stress that the autonomy is coming closer and in a debate on the essence of the autonomy between the sides the dozens of Jewish settlements in the heart of the land of Judaea and Samaria will be the decisive factor. They can disrupt the hasty steps to establish a Palestinian entity in the areas. This argument is not unreasonable for the majority of the government. But there is a difference between a political stand and a political fact.

Every public opportunity must be utilized in order to attain the objective set by the settlers with the government's agreement, which is extensive settlement on land needed for their subsistence. It is most advisable for the government to be loyal to itself, to devote thought and time to clarification and decision and to submit it to the settlers. There is no room for red tape. Promises must be kept.

The settlers are among the country's best people. They are believers and observers of the commands, for whom the Torah of Israel and the land of Israel are one and total Jewishness is their consciousness, mission and way of life. They and people like them, Zionist Jews in their essence, are the best part of the Jewish population in the country and the hope of the future of the state. In the face of foreign enemies and deceitful people in the country, including those who cringe before the heads of the PLO, we must bless their presence and readiness to fight for the right to settle in all land of Israel. Happy is the nation that has such sons and daughters.

It is right that the representatives of the religious and national movement, whose vision lights the path of the settlers, in the Knesset and government be the main spokesmen for these pioneers, so that they may reach their goal in a respected way and without difficult struggles for them and the state as a whole.

The land of Judaea and Samaria will also remain within the borders of the state of Israel during the period of autonomy, when dozens of Jewish settlements will shine on the slopes of its mountains and on their tops.

11,439
CSO: 4805

ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW RIGHTIST PARTY SCORED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Oct 79 p 13

[Article by 'Amos Eylon: "Renaissance or Dying"]

[Text] A young pop singer cried into the microphone: "Guys, I am dying to sing" and fished out "We Will Get up Tomorrow Morning With a New Song in Our Hearts" from the hackneyed repertory. The songs that followed were also old. Moshe Shamir, who since his departure from the Likud knows well who spreads pareve margarine on his meager slice of bread, preferred to go back to Bialik's very old school: "If We Wish To Know From Where We Derived Strength," he said in a free quotation, "Let Us Go to the Roots" and so forth.

The yarmulka wearers in the hall were pleased. Mrs. Geula Cohen quoted Rabbi Nahman from Bratslev. Hanan Porat quoted Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Cook from the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva, who is the ayatollah of Gush Emunim [Block of the Faithful]. Efrayim Ben Hayim from the Bet Oren Kibbutz quoted the doctrine of Israel and the doctrine of the land of Israel of Yitzhaq Tabenkin simultaneously. Thus, between one quotation and another a new political party to the right of Herut was established with great fervor in Jerusalem this week--Tenu'at Ha-tehiya [Renaissance Movement].

Demonstrators congregated outside, shouting: "The Renaissance Movement is the movement of death" and exchanged curses with the members of Kakh [Thus] of Rabbi Kahana, who screamed that the two bad eyes of the state of Israel, that is, Arabs and poverty, must be eradicated. There was violence in the humid air and a thick chain of policemen separated the camps. If not for the policemen, a riot would have certainly broken out. Obscene insults flew from side to side.

There was again something in the atmosphere fraught with physical and verbal violence and great hatred, which against the background of rising inflation could have reminded old people and those with good memory of the Weimar Republic. The name of the new party also could have evoked a terrible echo. It is clear that the founders did not intend to have a Hebrew version of the Iraqi Baath movement. Perhaps they thought about "Young People, Heralds of

Renaissance, Came From the Corners of the Country." But what is good in one generation sounds differently in another generation. In this generation, in this nation and under these circumstances the name of the new movement restores the ghost of Deutschland Erwache!

The editor of YEDIOT AHARONOT welcomed the new party and estimated that "objectively, its chances for holding an important position are not bad. The people are tired of our endless foldings. They are almost at the threshold of despair." If this is a sign for the future, this is certainly a sign of demoralization. Not long ago that newspaper published an article in favor of limiting democracy.

Is it an accident that no fewer than 3,000 desperate people crowded the big hall of Binyaney Hauma in Jerusalem in order to witness the birth of the new political creature? It is doubtful whether Begin or Peres could now gather such a big crowd without first making complicated and expensive arrangements for transporting the public. The hall was full to capacity. The public was varied, although it was almost purely Ashkenazi. It included seculars and yarmulka wearers, respectable bourgeois people and youth.

Many came from the armed ghettos surrounded by wire fences and watch dogs in Judeaea and Samaria, where they slept at night and which, apparently, were half empty during that evening. Elyaqim Hatzani, who threatens to establish a private militia in Kiryat Arba,' and the famous "spitter" from the vegetable garden of Neot Sinai were present.

It seems to me that of greater significance is the mixture, or the new coalition that is being formed, between the fundamentalists of the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva and the adventurous extremists who have emerged from the IDF in the last few years: the heads of Gush Emunim and Prof Yuval Neeman and such people as Maj Gen (Res) Avraham Yafe, the famous paratrooper Aharon Davidi and the hero of the 101 unit Meir Har-Tzion.

Cultural despair, which often has been diagnosed as one of the sources of European fascism, and blind "patriotism," which they call love of Israel, is their common denominator. Characteristically, the meeting was described as a "call to the colors." It was held under the slogan "all"--"the redemption of all the people of Israel in all of land of Israel." The public clapped hands when it heard selected passages from the Book of Genesis: "And God said... I shall give the land to your seed." No one mentioned the Prophets and Hagiographa.

The voice of the announcer exploded over the heads of the excited people with the primordial and alluring strength of the good tidings. The main speakers accompanied these good tidings with threats and warnings against deviators, deserters, proponents of concession, sowers of despair and those that stick knives in the back and with ringing cries of congratulation and warm words of encouragement for the healthy elements in the nation, first of all, the IDF and, primarily, Chief of the General Staff Lieut Gen Rafael Eytan, as well as "those who break the choking fences" in 'Ofra, Qedumim and other settlements.

The chairman said about the chief of the general staff: "We are with him and he is with us." I would like to be more certain than I am that this is not true.

Prof Yuval Neeman, who was introduced as a scientific genius and at least as a wunderkind ("at the age of 15 he graduated from the Herzliyya Gymnasium") demanded that the peace agreement with Egypt be cancelled, that there be no withdrawal from the settlements and from the oil wells and that Israeli citizens be given the opportunity of taking a personal initiative against terrorism. Knesset Member Geula Cohen determined resolutely that the people wanted to fight, but the leadership was tired. "There is no more barbaric a slogan," Geula Cohen shouted, "than the slogan of the Likud (!) 'Peace Is Better Than Undivided Land of Israel.'" Down with the "mystics of 'Peace Now'" and "those crazy for normalization."

Hanan Porat, one of the prophets of Gush Emunim, evoked a storm of applause among those present when he announced a new alliance between secular and religious people and between nationalists and socialists for a war against the false peace and for spreading "justice, purity and light" throughout Undivided Land of Israel. Professor Neeman proposed that one-third of the residents in the areas be evacuated to Saudi Arabia (applause). The rest, if they did not identify themselves with the goals of the Renaissance Movement, would be considered "alien residents."

No one can now estimate the electoral strength of the new party. It is easier to estimate its destructive effect on the existing political system. Mr Begin cannot easily get rid of those who try to realize the principles of his doctrine and who still have many allies in the coalition and at the government table. There is hardly any doubt that it will cause additional confusion and perhaps extremism both in the Likud and the NRP.

What will be the reaction of the Alignment? Mr Shimon Peres cannot easily get rid of the person that was his close adviser and confidant, Prof Yuval Neeman. The middlemen of strength in the coalition and opposition will try to maneuver, calm each other and compromise with half truths and improvised gestures. In the meantime, in the most vital area the dictatorship of Erik Sharon will continue behind the perforated screen of democracy.

The bitter truth is that neither in the Likud and NRP, nor in the Labor Party, for the time being, no one offers a convincing ideological answer to the tidings of despair and empty patriotism emanating from the Renaissance. What was born here this week is nurtured on the rot and hypocrisy spreading in all existing parties.

11,439
CSO: 4805

U.S. PLOT SEEN BEHIND GULF SECURITY PROPOSAL

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 23 Sep 79 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Plan To Protect the Gulf or Set Off a Conflagration in It?"]

[Text] Kuwait did well by promptly rejecting the Omani plan to give foreign states (America, Britain, and West Germany) the right to take part in the protection of the Gulf. We believe that it is incumbent on all Gulf states to reject this plan, because fundamentally the Gulf does not need foreign protection. On the contrary, by calling in guardians such as these, it will enter a zone of certain danger. For, as a matter of fact, the problem lies with them. They constitute the real danger to the people and states of the Gulf.

It is they who engage in intrigues in this area, sow discord in it, and draw dangers down upon it by amassing fleets and establishing bases, thereby whetting the appetite of the Soviet Union to interfere and concentrate forces in the area. This makes the Gulf a theater for war rather than a setting for peace.

Practically, the accomplishment of this plan would mean the de facto occupation of all the states which border on this Gulf. And it is in the nature of every occupation to kindle resistance, national pride, and rejection. This alone would throw the area into a state of disorder and chaos.

If these powers do not interfere, under whatever emblem or mask, then the Persian Gulf is not threatened by anyone...except by agents of the United States and Zionism. And this is a matter which is the responsibility of self-maintained security by, as well as true and sincere cooperation among the Gulf states themselves.

The sight of one American soldier--or any foreign soldier--on the land or waters of the Gulf would set off the blaze. Thus our hearts are filled with bitterness by this bitter picture, and we can stand it no longer. Perhaps the bitterness which is in us, and the pains and repressed feelings within our memory, are enough.

Furthermore, what kind of contempt does it show for our peoples if we continue to bring in foreigners to protect the few under the pretext of protecting the Gulf? For the few are not the Gulf, nor are they the land or the nations. And of course they are not the oil. Therefore why, and in what way, are we obliged to call in the Americans, with good cause, for protection, while all their weapons are killing us in Labanon, stripping us of our honor and sacred possessions, and leading us to the slaughter represented in a settlement of the Palestinian problem by force, conspiracy, and the sowing of factional discord, or in the incitement of the world against us?

Have a little wisdom, people! And a little intelligence, as well--unless this intelligence is employed for the sake of destroying this nation, or for entering into the service of purposes which are inimical to it, or for contradicting its welfare, its honor, and its aspirations for sovereignty and independence.

Whom do we fear with regard to the security of the Gulf? The Soviet Union?

The simplest person knows that the Soviet state, in spite of its aspirations to maintain an extensive presence in this rich area, is neither likely nor able to risk entering into certain war with the West in case of any military move against this area.

Thus, protection is directed at imaginary forces within the area so that the plan, and consequently the intervention, can be justified--not to mention the kindling of suspicions against the Palestinians themselves. That is, in its policy of aggression against the Arabs, the United States wants to make the Palestinians a threat, and thus is working with all its might to smash every Palestinian right and subdue every trace of Palestinian and Arab honor. Then it wants them to become eunuchs, slaves, American Indians.

Thus, through its assault on the Gulf--whether by means of fleets and bases or suspicious plans--the United States continues its operation of provocation, whereby it can set off a conflagration in the land of the Gulf and swallow up this land completely.

These are the goals of the American plan which is circulated on behalf of the government of Muscat. We believe that rejection, which has been announced by Baghdad and Kuwait, will be complete for all the states of the area. That is to say, not one rational person can even understand this plan, so how much less can he accept it?!

8591

CSO: 4802

BOYCOTT AGAINST AMERICAN GOODS URGED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 22 Sep 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Okay...Boycott Them!"]

[Text] Perhaps some people see in the verbal chicaneries which go on at times between the United States and Israel--such as objections to the establishment of settlements or rejection of the decision to purchase land in the West Bank and the sector--somewhat of a change in the hostile American position vis-a-vis the Arabs, or a possibility of wagering on such a change.

However, in view of the mass of clear and proven data, we see only an increase in American determination to subdue the Arab will, verbal deceptions notwithstanding.

It is our belief that living nations--and even historical leaderships--can discover the means to enable them to resist any aggressor who attacks them or their causes. If, as a result of existing conditions, the Arabs' circumstances do not permit them to embark on a military confrontation to gain national rights, this does not imply that there are no means of confrontation by other effective and successful methods.

Perhaps we may learn from others. In the 1940's, when he was leading the passive struggle against British colonialism, and perhaps on the basis of the doctrine of nonviolence in which he believed, Mahatma Gandhi found that equality was impossible between an unarmed people, namely the Indian people, and the heavily armed authorities of British colonialism.

Thus he decided on his specific method of confrontation: peaceful demonstrations. He also used other means of protest, the most important of which was his call for a boycott on all British goods and action to prevent port workers from loading or unloading British ships in any Indian port.

The army used every means of intimidation, but this boycott remained total until the British Crown was forced, in the face of this passive resistance, to give up its biggest pearl, India. And so British colonialism picked up its cane and left, and India became an independent state.

At this time we are in an urgent struggle with the United States. It is the United States which is undertaking to smash the Arab personality and is aiding Israel with all its might in continuing its occupation and plans for expansion. So long as the Arab military position, because of grievous considerations, does not allow effective confrontation, then the least we can do is employ the method of the Indian leader, Mahatma Gandhi. That is to say, a comprehensive Arab movement to boycott everything American must arise, and the Arab labor unions must move to make their workers join in this boycott, especially with regard to American ships or planes. When such a boycott occurs, the United States will feel in earnest that its vast interests with the Arabs have become endangered. It will find itself compelled to make a move and formulate a new position which is commensurate, if only to a certain extent, with the scale of American interests in the Arab region. But if we do not fight with weapons, but remain an open market for American goods and products while America continues to obtain oil and funds--and even military bases--then how can we expect Washington to change its position as long as it continues to acquire markets, funds, and oil--and bases--as we see happening?

Statements do not help a thing, and verbal positions remain mere empty frameworks without any meaning. Therefore, there must be a real position. And we believe that the most elemental real position demanded of us is this boycott. We shall see, if we do this, how long the United States can stand behind Israel and continue to support it in its occupation of Arab lands and of the Arab will.

But will we act? Or, as usual, do we possess, out of all the possible means, only words alone?

8591

CSO: 4802

SHIFTING ALLIANCES IN KUWAIT, GULF REGION ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 26 Oct 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Salim al-Lawzi, writing from Kuwait: "The Coup Which Surprised the People But Not the Ruler"]

[Text] When the Shi'ite situation in the Gulf region was agitated by the "revolutionary" pronouncements made by a number of Iranian clergymen, the first flicker of concern which flashed through my mind was related to the situation in Kuwait, although Bahrain was the primary target of those pronouncements. In addition to the personal bond that I have with Kuwait and its people, I have always considered it, and still do, the only light bulb shining in the Gulf region. Of all the Arab countries, there are two countries which today have an analogy of sorts; one--Kuwait--which has a press but no parliament, the other--Lebanon--which has a parliament but no longer has a free press.

During my visit to Kuwait this time, I heard the information minister, Shaykh Jabir al-'Ali, admiringly tell a group of Palestinian leaders about the vitality of the Lebanese which he has seen and felt during his latest visit to Lebanon. "Is it not amazing," he remarked, "that in a country whose sovereignty is divided among several parties, including the Palestinian revolution and Syrian deterrence forces, the Parliament continues to function on nothing more than moral strength, and the parliamentary committees continue to operate despite the sniping, shelling and kidnaping?" I told the shaykh that I was prepared to swap the Lebanese Parliament with him for the Kuwaiti press despite all the remarks made about that press and its members. I told him that he is welcome to have Kamil al-As'ad, Munir Abu Fadil and Hashim al-Husayni for 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, Ahmad al-Jarallah and Faysal al-Marzuq. To barter peanuts for steel is a profitable business, even if done only in jest. While it is said that the occupation of "journalism" is held in low esteem in the Arab world, I say that the occupation of being a parliamentary representative is even more trivial than that of being a journalist, because where there is no [free] press there is no [real] parliamentary representation, and the reverse is not true.

It has been my custom to begin any trip to Kuwait with a visit to its amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad. This custom goes back to more than 20 years--a long time before he reached the pinnacle of power--when Shaykh Jabir was controller of oil affairs in the Al-Ahmadi area. My visits to him became customary when he became controller of oil. By dint of his profession, a journalist is always attracted to and fascinated by an official who possesses information and can solve all kinds of riddles for him. If the Chinese proverb, "He who knows talks not and he who talks knows not" ever applies to any Arab country, it surely applies most to Kuwait, whose amir prefers to listen rather than talk, and when he talks it is not for the record, or at least he would not want to be identified.

In between the two meetings I had with the amir during my present visit to Kuwait, I ran across a Marxist fellow journalist who said to me: The Gulf region is not only rich in oil but also in local conflicts, and if I were an American intelligence officer (perhaps this is a subliminal wish in his subconscious) and wanted to blow up the situation in Kuwait, I would not pay attention to the social or political fields, but concentrate on the economic field. Security in Kuwait, he said, is not a social one, as it is in Bahrain for example, but an economic security.

He pointed out that the Iranians who live here or who have become naturalized Kuwaitis control the food market and play an important role in the foreign exchange and the real-estate market. My Marxist colleague believes that those Iranians can starve the people if they were to be backed by an organized force. The dislocation which the Iranian revolution has caused in the economic makeup of Kuwait is due to the fact that for the past 10 years, the regime has been depending on the Iranians in Kuwait to achieve an internal balance. This balance is now upset. According to my Marxist colleague, Kuwait is presently divided into four segments. The first segment is made up of the native Kuwaitis whom he calls "the founders." The second segment comprises the Iranians who are either residents of Kuwait or naturalized citizens and who include such persons as Hujjat al-Islam 'Abbas al-Mahri, an in-law of Imam Khomeyni who was stripped of his nationality together with 17 members of his family when they tried to form a political and religious force dedicated to the overthrow of the regime. The third segment is those Palestinians who are resident in Kuwait or who have become naturalized citizens (the PLO which is allied with the Iranian revolution exercises an influence on them). The last segment is made up of the other Arab communities living in Kuwait. My Marxist colleague concluded his analysis by saying: The question is how will the regime re-establish the balance that has been upset.

The flaw in my colleague's thinking is not in his analysis of the Kuwaiti situation but in his approach of applying Marxist criteria to an oil-rich society such as the Kuwaiti society. There is something called the special or particularistic circumstances of an oil-rich country. Those who least

understand the special conditions of an oil-rich country are the disciples of Marx or those political thinkers whose point of departure is the premise of class struggle. If Karl Marx were alive today, he would have declared at the top of his voice: My ideas and theories were not meant to analyze societies which have been shoveling out wealth from the treasures of Solomon the Wise.

Marx had analyzed wealth in industrial societies which were forged by the expertise of the entrepreneur and the labor of the worker. But the wealth in the oil-rich countries is one of God's blessings and the fruit of geological accident. And since we are talking here of Kuwait, the rich Kuwaitis have not bled the proletariat or set up plants and factories run by the toil of the working class. Instead of admitting their mistaken concepts about the special conditions of the oil-rich countries, the disciples of Marx occasionally find it expedient to summon folk sayings and maxims, such as the saying that money obscures defects, and that when a ruler has a lot of money he can buy everyone. When a crisis breaks out, the disciples of Marx suddenly sweep aside their dialectical criteria and turn into seers, passing out judgements in the name of the historical imperative.

There is a certain truth in what they [the Marxists] say, because the wealth amassed by the oil ruler is so vast that it dazzles the eyes, ties up the tongues of critics and restrains their hands from writing. But such opinions and analyses, though true in part, involve a great deal of deceptive oversimplification. There is no ruler in the world who does not need a policy, a political horizon or political craftsmanship. Money can also be a double-edged weapon in many cases. A ruler in the Arab countries does not rule merely because he commands great wealth, but also because he has a good grasp of his society and an insight into its mechanics. To begin with, he is fully acquainted with the divisions and sensitivities in his society and has articulated a certain policy to deal with them. Secondly, he often has a superior knowledge of the substance of the society in which he lives. A ruler who says, "I know that the survival or demise of Kuwait--indeed, the survival or demise of the Kuwaiti system--is determined by the economic factor, not by the division of Kuwait into four segments of community, as your Marxist friend says..." is in one sense an economist who knows that any group which takes itself out of the financial circuit or cycle will give another group waiting in the wings the opportunity to replace it, because there can be no standstill or gap in the financial cycle.

In Kuwait, the ruler is quite aware of the contradictions and paradoxes in his society, and knows more than anyone else that his ability to control those contradictions and paradoxes and to rule through them is what makes him the prisoner of the seat on which he sits. I asked him once: "Why don't you divide some of your powers among those who are around you and only retain the power of decision-making?" He replied: Rule in a society such as Kuwait cannot be served by mechanical, routine or organizational methods

and approaches such as those practiced in industrial societies. A ruler here is compelled to deal with the roots and substance of issues, and sometimes with their details. Believe me when I say that I feel sometimes that I will die sitting on this chair.

It is perhaps ironical that some of the Gulf rulers have a better grasp and a more realistic awareness of the fissures in their societies than others do. It is also ironical that modern nationalist thinkers have been either unable or unwilling to see the oil society as it really is. In the flurry of recent events, Dr Ahmad al-Khatib, one of the most prominent nationalist thinkers not only in Kuwait but in the entire Gulf region too, has fallen prey to the same errors made by the Marxists, who have failed to recognize the contradictions and divisions and who do not want to see reality as it is for fear that by admitting those contradictions, divisions and reality they would be consecrating them. Dr Ahmad al-Khatib thus went along with the movement led by Hujjat al-Islam 'Abbas al-Mahri and his son, Ahmad, on the premise that any opponent of the Kuwaiti regime is an ally, regardless of his religious, social or political affinities. Addressing the supporters of al-Mahri's Shi'ite movement at a rally in Al-Husayniyah, al-Khatib told them: You are not the only victims of injustice.

The flaw in al-Khatib's attitude is his inability to detect the real nature of al-Mahri's movement. If that movement were a Kuwaiti or Arab movement, there would be nothing wrong in supporting it. Al-Mahri and al-Khatib are not the only people who have complaints about the regime in Kuwait. But the inspiration behind al-Mahri's movement is an Iranian inspiration. The Shi'ite gatherings which have recently taken place in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have hitched themselves to the Iranian revolution and have taken the form of a shu'ubiyah [a movement in the early Islamic reign which rejected and challenged the predominance of Arabs] trend. That movement has been arousing sectarian chauvinism under the pretense that the rights of its members are denied and that the regime is not inspired in its actions by the shari'ah [law of Islam], that is to say by the Khomeyni revolution. This is the reason why the move made by Dr Ahmad al-Khatib triggered a flurry of denunciations and caused his friends and admirers to criticize him even before his opponents and detractors had done so. To them, the Khomeyni revolution is still a national, Iranian revolution which should not be given precedence over [Arab] nationalist considerations. The admir of Kuwait has been asked: Do you consider the deportation of 17 members of the al-Mahri family an ordinary case? 'Abbas al-Mahri carried the religious title of "hujjat al-Islam" in addition to being the husband of Khomeyni's sister. In his response, the amir said: We did not consider the religious aspect or family ties. To us it was a matter of a Kuwaiti citizen who has violated the law. What has happened was not an ordinary matter, otherwise we would not have revoked his naturalization. A Kuwaiti citizen cannot have double allegiance. When a great power such as the United States acquiesced in the dual allegiance of some of its Jewish

citizens, American interests--indeed, American security--had to pay the price, as we know and can see. Kuwait had opened its doors to al-Mahri. He lived here, got married, became rich and obtained citizenship. Then suddenly he turns into an advocate of overthrowing the regime in favor of another regime. Should we have accepted the principle of dual allegiance, kept mum and buried our heads in the sand?

The amir was then asked: Do you believe that al-Mahri's movement is finished? He said confidently: It was not a movement, but an attempt, and we have nipped it in the bud and it is now over.

Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah, the crown prince and prime minister, has told me: If what has happened in Kuwait occurred in any other country, the army would have intervened, martial law would have been declared and extraordinary measures would have been taken. But we have tackled the problem calmly but firmly. We have applied the law, and that's the long and short of it.

There is a conviction in Kuwait and Bahrain that the assurances received by the two states that Iran has no ambition in the Arab oil-producing countries are no more than an adjournment of the problem. What is happening now is that the officials in Tehran say something and the ayatollahs who claim to represent the Islamic revolution say something else. The statements made by Khomeyni himself are contradictory. At times, he wants to export the revolution, at other times he wants to confine it to Iran. All this is due either to a process of division of roles or to chaos, impulsiveness, foolishness or even to the fact that some elements are in the pay of certain foreign powers. Both situations have consequences which should be assessed. And if the Iranian revolution achieved permanence or degenerated into mini-states, there will be consequences too. At any rate, Iran's oil resources will be depleted in 10 years. An Arab-Iranian conflict, especially in the small Gulf states where Iran has ambitions, followers and supporters, is inevitable. When such a conflict breaks out, it would do Iran no good to veil its national ambitions under the cloak of Islam, because ultimately Islam is Arab before it is Iranian, Pakistani or Turkish.

Within this frame of reference, a quiet debate is going on at the highest level of authority in Kuwait--a debate that is divorced from Marxist and nationalist thought alike. It proceeds from the fact cited by Dr 'Abdullah al-Nafisi that Kuwait is a country where several minorities co-exist. None of the groups living there--the Kuwaitis, the Palestinians, the Iranians and the other communities--has a majority. The distinctions among those minorities will continue to diminish. True, the Kuwaitis should retain certain privileges because they are the founders and because they were the ones who had to endure poverty and hardship in times past. Yet the privileges of the founders in America over the newer immigrants did not bar a Jewish immigrant from Nazi Germany, who was not even born in the United States, namely, Henry Kissinger, to become secretary of state and, in fact, to wield more influence in foreign policy than his boss, President Nixon. To broaden the

base of the indigenous population is a policy pursued by all states that wish to maintain their ability to develop and to anticipate problems before they occur. Those Arabs, for example, who were born, brought up and educated at government expense in Kuwait should not be considered immigrants. As long as the country needs them, why then should it not keep them? Then there is a rule observed by all the advanced countries of the world, namely, to add the brightest and most outstanding members of any community or minority to the domain of the founders. Educational excellence and intellectual superiority qualify those persons who have them to join the club of the privileged class in any system which desires to broaden its base and increase the number of the beneficiaries from the system. This is the best way to fortify Kuwait against the winds of change and conspiracy attempts.

Although the ruler in Kuwait is convinced of the correctness of this approach, he wants to be certain of the possible consequences in the event of the application of such approach. It is generally in the interest of any Arab ruler--be he good or bad--to take advantage of the contradictions in the society. This would give him a greater leeway for maneuverability. Here I would like to make an observation: It is not accidental that the Arab rulers who have endured and stayed in power longer than others are those who are descended from ruling dynasties and families which took up politics as a profession. The reason should be clear. Those rulers are experts on the particularities, sensitivities and contradictions in their societies, whereas a ruler who came to power through elections or a military coup usually lacks this kind of expertise, or may occasionally be a person driven by a pan-Arab vision--a vision which has been historically lacking in its awareness of the factionalism and divisions which underlie the Arab world.

The ruling dynasties and the families which have mastered the art of controlling contradictions and paradoxes have greatly benefited from the methods used by the international powers which study the demography and social systems in our countries and act accordingly. The communists were the first to catch on to the presence of sectarian impulses and minority complexes. If the Arab peoples continue to cling to their unrealistic view of their social, sectarian and communal composition, their fate will remain in the hands of the foreign and local experts on divisions and fissures. At best, their fate will remain in the hands of the dynasties and those scions who have mastered the art of holding the reins of power.

Upon the conclusion of my meetings with all those whom I sought to meet in Kuwait, my Marxist colleague asked me: What was the outcome of your discussions. Instead of a direct answer, I thought it would be better to use his style of using folk sayings. I said: There are a lot of people here who believe that in the absence of sentries in many Arab countries, the chief sentry in Kuwait is God Almighty, because oil is God's gift and protecting it is one of God's blessings. As it was said of the Ka'bah that "the Ka'bah has God for a protector," it can also be said that "oil has God for a

protector." The new problem in Kuwait which has taken the people by surprise, but not the ruler, is the coup which altered the shape of alliances. Had a fortune teller or a clairvoyant predicted 2 years ago that a day will come when the Iranians and Palestinians will stand arm in arm as allies, he would have been dismissed as a charlatan, an imposter or a scaremonger. But this is exactly what the situation is today: the Palestinians and the Iranians are allies.

My friend said: Do you belittle this coup and take it lightly? Not at all, I said, but I am not worried about its consequences.

9254

CSO: 4802

STATEMENT OF MARONITE PATRIARCH KHURAYSH

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 6 Oct 79 p 1

[Article: "Khuraysh: 'Some Heads of Petty States Are More Important and Stronger Than the President'"]

[Text] Maronite Patriarch Antonius Butrus Khuraysh has announced that he does not hold a mandate from the Maronite sect to bring about national reconciliation, and said that the partitioning of Lebanon is impossible without bringing about the destruction of everyone. He added that there are petty states in Lebanon, and the heads of some of these states are more important and stronger than the president of the republic.

These comments were made in a press interview given by Patriarch Khuraysh before his trip to the Vatican. The interview was published today in the French-language magazine LA RIVE DE LIBAN.

Khuraysh reiterated what he said when he made his attempt to bring together the "Lebanese Front" and leaders of the north, namely that "the tyranny of a violent state is better than the justice of a party." He said: "I can only speak the truth, because I am weak before two things: the law and the truth."

He pointed out that the state is demolished and must be repaired from within and without, and that this will not take place except through unity in the Lebanese ranks.

With regard to the issue of the South, he said: "I believe that this problem and the problem of Lebanon as a whole could be solved if the Lebanese would return to their consciences and triumph over the personal and selfish differences among them."

Concerning the new system for Lebanon, he said it must be based either on a return to the semblance of agreement upon which Lebanon was built, or on the replacement of this agreement with a better one.

He also said that there is no disagreement among the clergy: "For the war which broke out in Lebanon is not a religious war, as is indicated by the fact that members of the same religion have fought among themselves more often than members of two different sects have fought each other." He wished that the reconciliation that he began between Basharri and Zagharta would extend over all of Lebanon, and he saw this reconciliation not as a new alliance but "rather as a new attempt to spread peace among all Lebanese." He stated that conflict exists among Maronite leaders, "but this conflict is not limited to the Maronite sect."

He added that if the purpose of the spiritual summit is to issue statements and take pictures, this is something that happens all the time. But if the goal is to bring members of every sect together as a preliminary step toward reconciliation, then this requires a mandate. "And in all frankness, I do not possess a mandate from my sect; and furthermore, the spiritual leaders in the rest of the sects are unable to bring their members together."

8591

CSO: 4802

LIBYAN OPPOSITION ATTACKS QADHDHAFI DESPOTISM

London AL-JIHAD in Arabic Sep 79 pp 2-3

[Text] These days, Qadhdhafi and his demons are absorbed in the wedding feast that he is holding in self-adulation over completing 10 years of maltreating the Libyan people and destroying the nation. Qadhdhafi has not spared any effort or money on those enormously expensive celebrations costing hundreds of millions of dinars.

It suffices to point out that those invited from abroad number 10,000. Just imagine the extent of the unreal expenditures for that purpose, plus what the rapid improvements have cost to embellish the appearance of the buildings and roads that the guests will be in the vicinity of. A fast job of shining up the shabby regime's face and a quick makeup job for the dirty regime's skin. If we add to that the huge sums that Qadhdhafi will scatter on some of the insignificant, spendthrift newsmen, who will fall on some of them to pick them up, and who have become used to making their pens available in the public sale to whoever pays more, it is clear to us that the treasury of the revolutionary Jamahiriyah will be hit with bankruptcy.

The Qadhdhafi regime forbade the granting of entry visas to Libya at the present time to those not invited. If you are an Arab not planning to request an entry visa, you will not get one because Qadhdhafi is busy getting ready for Arab unity, and after he achieves it we will travel about in the Arab countries without any need for entry visas. All that is a matter of short duration that will be achieved through the efforts of the champion of unity, and nothing is expected to stand in his way. If you are a Palestinian, you would not waste your time requesting an entry visa to the paradise of the revolutionary Jamahiriyah, for the savior leader is busy paving the way for liberation. If you waited awhile, then through the mighty efforts of the brother leader you would enter Palestine and there would be no need to wait for an entry visa to the Jamahiriyah. It is all a matter of just a short while, and there is nothing to prevent you from expecting it.

Qadhafi is inviting 10,000 persons from abroad to attend the anniversary of his vicious military takeover, while tens of thousands of Libyans are openly being expelled from the country. You would really like to understand all this, but you get dizzy thinking of it!

Do You Know

Do you know that a third of the revenue of Qadhafi's Jamahiriya is now being spent on the Chadian war and its requirements? This of course is in addition to the Libyan and Chadian lives being consumed. If the Chadian war continues in this way, Qadhafi will bring about complete financial bankruptcy after having achieved complete intellectual and spiritual bankruptcy.

Perhaps only now, 10 years after the seizure of power by Lt Mu'amar (Abu-Minyar), many Libyans and Arabs with good intentions have been able to grasp his political leanings and are convinced that he is no more than an infamous American tool fashioned out of earthly extremism and the cover that are necessary to perfect the role that was assigned to him.

The story of Qadhafi (Abu-Minyar's) commission for the American Central Intelligence Agency is not something just conceived, but rather goes back some years prior to 1969.

CIA representatives were all over Libya, in the army as military advisors and in the schools and universities under the well-known Peace Corps units, at that time. The search was made for a qualified person who would be prepared to play a well-defined role, and they found that Lieutenant Mu'amar was the best, most capable person to undertake that role.

The preparatory operation began right after 1967, after they advised him to send a telegram to the chief of staff requesting permission to go to Egypt to fight against Israel--a bold stand that could serve as a means of polarizing some of the officers who were very fervent over the issue of nationalism.

The preparatory operation involved the following steps, and here we cite the most important of them:

1. Singling him out from among his associates as having a sort of halo, making him appear to his associates as having revolutionary saintliness, and as possessing a simplicity and self-sacrifice for the sake of general national action and self-denial.
2. Protecting him from the eyes of the Libyan intelligence agents in the army and police, providing him with certain publications to guide his concern and shape his thinking in accordance with what they wanted of him, and with certain information which is abundantly available only to those who

enjoy the full confidence of the regime, so that this information could be used at an appropriate time as a means of attracting certain officers in charge of most of the sensitive centers in Libya, the seizure of which was necessary to ensure a successful takeover.

3. Including him in a special study group that met in the home of one of the officers of the American military mission in Benghazi. Some of the study meetings were attended from time to time by Captain al-Kharubi.

4. At the highest levels, the Americans were even certain that Lieutenant Mu'ammarr would be ready to take over power. They arranged a special visit for U.S. Ambassador to Libya David Newsom and some of his aides in the embassy to Fezzan, to visit the Jarmah ruins. During that visit, which lasted about 2 weeks, there was a lengthy meeting between David Newsom, then U.S. ambassador to Libya and now undersecretary of state for African affairs, and Lt Mu'ammarr (Abu-Minyar), with Captain (Jallud) attending. That took place in the first half of 1969. At that meeting, the functions that the Americans should undertake when everything was ready were defined.

5. The Americans persuaded King Idris al-Sanusi to take a long trip to Greece and then convinced him to abdicate in favor of his heir apparent. All of these matters were raised in the Libyan street, so as to till the soil for the new seed that the Americans wanted to sow in the Libyan soil, and to condition the general atmosphere.

6. In July 1969, one of the principal employees of the U.S. Embassy gave an evening farewell party for the U.S. ambassador to Libya, whose transfer was decided, as usual, after the plot was hatched and before its execution. The party was attended in civilian clothing by Lieutenant Mu'ammarr and Captain al-Kharubi although they knew that the attendance of two officers at a diplomatic party was prohibited under military regulations. Secret talks were held at that party.

7. Certain circles made it known that a military takeover was imminent and that it would be led by Col 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shahi, and that the king favored the takeover in order to prevent the assumption of power by the heir apparent--the object of his anger. This would prepare for Qadhdhafi's takeover and remove obstacles from his way. Most officers would not oppose it, and it would have failed if it were known that Lieutenant Qadhdhafi was behind it, because the officers considered Qadhdhafi to be an unbalanced, stupid, unsteady person who was not taken seriously, but rather looked on as an object of scorn and ridicule.

8. Throughout August 1969, the mobile forces in Tripoli under the command of Ahmad (Jahim), now the Libyan consul in Palermo, Italy, were on standby alert, as was the force under the command of the late Lieutenant General (Bushah) defending Barqah.

9. Certain foreign quarters informed certain officials of the Libyan regime that the Americans were ready to support the revolutionary movement and that all preparations had been made, including the fact that the commander of Wheelus air base had withdrawn all aircraft from the base to Germany and had informed certain U.S. officers that some action would soon be taken in Libya and that consequently they should take any necessary precautions.

10. At midnight of 31 August, 2 or 3 hours before the army units were to get underway, the maximum standby alert was cancelled for all the mobile forces in Tripoli and the defense force in Barqah, Benghazi.

11. At 3 a m on 1 September 1969, small forces of the army moved to seize control and did not encounter any resistance. On the contrary, some senior officers and police went to the aid of the insurrectionist forces with information from the Americans, and there are those who believe that al-Shahi undertook his promised insurrection.

12. A new meeting was held 10 years after that one. The first one took place secretly in Jarmah, Fezzan, when Mu'ammār was still a 1st Lieutenant in the army. The second took place secretly in Tripoli, with Mu'ammār in the post of dictator of Libya. And the main personage in each of the two meetings was David Newsom, currently an American undersecretary of state, who was his country's ambassador to Libya when the first meeting was held.

This second meeting took place after a speech delivered by Mu'ammār Qadhafi on 11 June 1979. In it, he tried to put into effect a policy outside the scope designed for him. In order to prevent some of his childish actions, and to give him a new role that would please his vanity, his old friend Newsom was sent to him. The upcoming days will be an excellent indication for the exposure of this destructive role.

5346

CSO: 4802

QADHDHAFI SAID DESTROYING SMALL TRADESMEN

London AL-JIMAD in Arabic Sep 79 p 2

[Text] Qadhdhafi has declared that the role of the small shops is at an end and that they will be closed down. Actually, with this statement, a campaign of measures to implement what the master leader had previously announced began. These measures include that of not renewing the licenses of the small shops and closing them down. In this way, Qadhdhafi will have plenty of people to be conscripted into his military, which apparently has decided to announce or participate in a universal war. Qadhdhafi may have handed over these small shops to his relatives, to demons and to others like them.

From a rational standpoint, these perverted rulers are a great offense and degradation to the socialism with which they are anointed. If capitalism had wished for a far-reaching offense against socialism, it would have been duty bound to invent and create persons such as these idiotic, complicated agents. Socialism coming from such persons as these is devoid of all innocence.

These agents flex their muscles at the small shopowners and shut their eyes to the greedy international oil companies like Exxon, Mobil and Occidental. Citizen Muhammad Ahmad or Faraj Ibn Hasan, owner of a small shop, serves the people, while Exxon, Mobile, Occidental and other oil companies do not. Qadhdhafi doesn't touch these huge companies which plunder and drain the wealth of the Jamahiriya, rather they are provided with all sorts of care and revolutionary concern and patient facilitations, while the small citizen is [considered to be] a vicious, greedy, blood-sucking exploiter! Mentally, Qadhdhafi is like a topsy-turvy woman customer who wants to cover the sun with a sieve.

5346

CSO: 4802

INTERVIEW WITH LIBYAN PETROLEUM SECRETARY

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Oct 79 pp 6, 7

[Interview with Ezzedin Mabruk, Libyan Petroleum Secretary]

[Text] Libya has acquired a reputation as a maverick among oil producers; it is a reputation which the following interview with Oil Minister Ezzedin Mabruk will do little to dispel. Talking to AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO's Randa Takieddine during the OPEC seminar in Vienna last week, he called for a new increase in oil prices because the US dollar was still sliding despite a three-month price freeze.

Mr Mabruk appears to make a glaring error when he asserts that the total oil consumption of African countries is 200,000 b/d. In 1977, Africa (excluding Algeria, Libya and Egypt) imported 830,000 b/d of petroleum products alone. Mr Mabruk was presumably referring to Africa's imports of Libyan oil.

Q: Do you think that the continued weakness of the US dollar would justify a further increase in the price of oil at OPEC's next conference? If so, by how much should the price rise?

A: It is certain that the situation justifies a new increase; as for the percentage, we are now holding discussions with other OPEC members. We had a price freeze for three months but the dollar is still sliding. It is perfectly normal that we think of compensating for this.

Q: Is there any change in Libya's oil production and export policies?

A: Our current production is 2.1 million barrels a day, of which we export almost 2 million b/d. This level will be maintained next year; we do not intend to increase production.

Q: Dr Abdulhady Hassan Taher, the head of Saudi Arabia's Petromin, has forecast a glut of oil next year. Do you agree with him?

A: Inshallah; this would benefit the world as a whole; but I definitely think he is an optimistic man. If producers maintain current levels of output and if consumers put conservation policies into effect, supply and demand may balance for a while, but I am not sure we shall see an excess of supply. However, if we receive gifts from heaven we shall welcome them.

Q: Do you think the circumstances are now right for a dialogue between producers and the Western countries?

A: Our stand on this is quite clear. We have nothing against a dialogue, far from it, we should welcome one. But I do not share the view that some people have expressed here, that a dialogue can begin next month. Organising a dialogue between different groups is a dangerous matter. The proposed dialogue between the Gulf countries and the EEC is just one example. Questions like this should be examined very carefully.

Q: What is Libya doing to help the non-oil producing developing countries, which were hit hardest of all by the latest increases in the price of oil?

A: This is obviously a question we must face. But take some specific examples, India and Yugoslavia. India exports technology. Yugoslavia is an advanced country.

We have no obligations towards developing countries as such, since we too are a developing nation. The only difference between them and us is that God gave oil to us and not to them. We help those who deserve our help. The most important question is how we distribute our aid. We do not believe in the efficiency of projects like Iraq's proposal for a long-term fund. When a country is in need, we are ready to give aid and to give oil free of charge. This does not represent much. The total consumption of the African countries is only 200,000 b/d, so we can easily afford to help those who deserve it.

Talk about long-term funds involving the industrial countries is unrealistic and irrelevant and should be dropped.

CSO: 4820

AID TO MALI FOR DEVELOPMENT, ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 3 Oct 79 p 7

[Article by 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Daud: "Kingdom Offers Mali \$150 Million; Kingdom Participates with \$100 Million in Great Niger River Project"]

[Excerpts] The year 1975 was a turning point in Arab-African relations, for it was in this year that the late King Faysal made a trip which included a number of African states.

The King was able to alter relations and ties between the two blocs in favor of the Arab cause, beginning with the severance of diplomatic relations between the African states and Israel. As a result, these states attained significant furtherance of their next phase toward a future which ensures them of achieving international balance in their joint interests and support for their development programs.

Saudi-Malian Aid

With regard to the material and economic aid which the kingdom provides to the Malian Government, His Excellency [Ahmad Zaki Salih, Saudi minister plenipotentiary and charge d'affaires in Mali] said that many aid programs and agreements exist between the kingdom and Mali. One of the most important of these is the agreement which has been concluded by the Malian Government, the Saudi Development Fund along with the other Arab funds in the Gulf, and the Arab-African Bank for the purpose of financing a project for construction of the (Silanga) Dam, which will supply the capital, Bamako, with water and ensure the electricity it needs for use in industrial projects. The dam will also create a lake which will be utilized for irrigation and agriculture. The kingdom has provided \$15 million as its share in this giant project, as well as an additional \$5 million to cover the cost of paving the road leading to the dam.

In addition, the kingdom has provided 10 million riyals as its participation in certain health and social projects, which include construction of two clinics in the suburbs of Bamako. These clinics will contain sections for maternity and infant care as well as sections for general medicine and surgery, and will be supplied with the latest in medical equipment. The clinics are currently on the verge of completion and will be handed over in 3 months.

Another project involves construction of dental centers, including a public center in the capital and branches in the form of dental clinics located in various areas. A third project involves support for the importation of equipment and action to supplement this equipment, especially the essential items. A fourth project is for the construction of two Islamic religious courts in the cities of Mopti and Akai. These two courts will be completed in the near future. Mr Salih went on to say: "In addition, the kingdom previously built the Great Bamako Mosque, considered one of the biggest landmarks in the city, at a cost of \$4.5 million some years ago. The Saudi Development Fund is financing 50 percent of the costs of a cattle-raising project in the area of Nabujo in partnership with the Malian Government and the U.S. AID organization. The project, which cost a total of \$13.5 million, is aimed at developing and improving cattle raising, protecting the cattle from disease, and employing modern technology in raising them, as well as at working toward exporting the cattle abroad."

Furthermore, the kingdom provided \$2 million as its part for a popular housing project for state employees. The project is located on the airport road and contains 64 villas. The kingdom also paid \$2 million to ensure the purchase of irrigation equipment for the Niger River Administration when that administration wanted to modernize and recondition its equipment. Also, the kingdom paid \$1 million for study of a project involving irrigation stations in the northern regions of Timbuktu.

Mr Salih added: "What I have mentioned thus far represents direct aid offered by the kingdom over 3 years. The kingdom has also provided indirect aid to the Malian Government, including the initial agreement on the part of the Saudi Development Fund to participate in financing the construction of a cement plant in the first region. The purpose of this project is to ensure the cement needs of the Senegal Basin project (Malinatali Dam), which serves Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. The Senegal Basin project is one of the vital projects serving these three states. It is a joint venture in which Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait all participate. The kingdom alone participates with over \$100 million. This project will help improve navigation on the Niger River and will create an area for industrialization, in view of the availability of electric power produced by the dam water. The kingdom previously provided \$5 million in aid to the coastal states and people suffering from the drought. The states which received this aid included Mali, Senegal, Zambia, and Chad. The aid took the form of food for the citizens. Also included under indirect aid is the kingdom's participation in various programs of UNESCO and the International Food and Agriculture Organization. Thus, the kingdom took part in financing the opening of a center for the development of rice cultivation, among various other programs."

Islamic Aid

Concerning Islamic aid offered to the state of Mali by Saudi Arabia, Ahmad Zaki Salih, charge d'affaires of the Saudi Embassy in Mali, said: "There is a large number of Islamic projects in which the Islamic World League participates, one of which involves providing aid to the more than 45 Islamic Arabic schools scattered throughout Mali. The league has also financed a project involving a school for the Sunni and construction of the Mopti mosque, and has participated with 3 million riyals in the construction of an Islamic vocational institute especially for graduates of Islamic Arabic schools, as well as construction of the Djenne Mosque, construction of commercial shops belonging to the Great Mosque in Bamako--which are dependent on the mosque and whose proceeds are to be used for the mosque's upkeep--and construction of a larger lecture hall for the mosque in Bamako."

The kingdom has also provided intermittent aid at various times to the Arabic and Islamic schools in order to assist them in fulfilling their mission, developing their instructional materials, and attracting the greatest possible number of Malians to study in them. The kingdom hopes to present academic scholarships for Saudi universities to Malian youths in order to enable them to complete their university education.

Islamic Youth Camp and Its Effect

Concerning the Islamic youth camp held in Bamako and the extent of its effect on the Malian people, Mr Salih said: "The idea of holding the camp was a very profitable one. It serves Moslem youth and opens an avenue of communication among them, and it has received a good response--especially from the Malian youth themselves, because the Malian people are known for their Islamic attitude. Even the Malian minister of youth and culture was continually in contact with the embassy to discuss the needs of the camp, and so was the Malian ambassador to the kingdom. We are thankful that the camp has been held, and we have felt great success which encourages us to hold another camp, because this first experience has been very encouraging.

"There was direct contact among the embassy, the World Council for Islamic Youth, and the Islamic Solidarity Fund for the purpose of participation and assistance, and in fact we made some proposals which were accepted by the council."

Speaking of Malian pilgrims, the ambassador said: "The embassy cooperates with the Malian Government in this area, and some time ago we began arranging pilgrimage affairs and granting the pertinent visas. The embassy does many things to facilitate matters for Malian pilgrims and supplies them with the necessary instructions. The embassy usually grants about 2,500 visas to pilgrims each year."

Moslems make up more than 90 percent of Mali's population, and a good portion of them speak Arabic--especially those who have received their education in Islamic or Arabic schools. Moreover, there is considerable interest in learning the Arabic language, and thus the kingdom tries to publicize the Islamic institutes, shcools, and centers in order to spread the teachings of the true Islamic religion and the Arabic language among the friendly Malian people.

8591

CS0: 4802

PETROMIN ANNOUNCED AIRCRAFT FUEL PIPELINE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Oct 79 p 2

[Article: "PETROMIN Assumes Management of Pipeline To Transport Aircraft Fuel in Dhahran; Work Is in Progress To Establish Lines To Transport Oil Products in al-Sharqiyah"]

[Text] Within the next 10 days, PETROMIN will assume management of a new pipeline to carry aircraft fuel from the main storage tanks in Dhahran. The capacity of the 8.5-kilometer pipeline is 100,000 barrels per day.

This was announced in a statement by Mr Abu al-Jadayil, the executive member assigned to marketing affairs for PETROMIN. He said that this is one of a large number of projects currently being implemented by the organization, and that other projects will enter the implementation phase shortly. He explained that the projects now being implemented include construction of two pipelines to transport oil products from the Ra's Tannurah refinery to PETROMIN's storage tanks in Dhahran and the installation of pumps with a capacity of 140,000 barrels [per day]. The pipelines will be 15 miles long, the entire distance under water.

He also said that inland pipelines and 11 loading platforms are to be constructed to load trucks and railroad cars.

Mr Abu al-Jadayil mentioned that PETROMIN is currently constructing eight oil storage tanks with a combined capacity of 1.2 million barrels. The cost of the tanks is 225 million riyals. The first stage of the project is expected to be finished in the middle of next year, and the final stage should be completed in 1981.

Also under construction are reserve storage tanks and loading platforms in the al-Jadif area which will be supplied by a pipe from Ra's Tannurah. These facilities will cost 25 million riyals.

PETROMIN's marketing director also stated that projects soon to enter the implementation phase in the al-Sharqiyah area at a cost of 120 million riyals include construction of storage tanks and petroleum distribution facilities in the cities of al-Hufuf and al-Jubayl, and improvement and development of distribution facilities in the city of al-Safaniyah.

Concerning PETROMIN projects in the areas of Riyadh, al-Qasim, al-Kharj and Najran, Mr Abu al-Jadayil mentioned that two tanks for storage of aircraft fuel in the central region have been handed over. These tanks have a capacity of 100,000 barrels and cost 6 million riyals.

A contract has been awarded for construction of storage tanks and an installation to supply aircraft with fuel at Badanah airport at a cost of 15 million riyals. Also, work will begin soon on the development and improvement of distribution facilities in the areas of Riyadh, al-Qasim, al-Kharj, and Najran.

The director added that projects still under study include a project to link distribution facilities in al-Jubayl with pipelines from Ra's Tannurah; construction of storage and distribution facilities in al-Qaysumah and connection of these facilities with pipelines originating at Ra's Tannurah and al-Jubayl; a project to link distribution facilities in al-Kharj with pipelines originating at the Riyadh oil refinery; and construction of an aircraft fuel loading unit at the new Riyadh airport and connection of this unit with a pipeline from the Riyadh refinery.

With regard to PETROMIN's marketing activities, Abu al-Jadayil said that the organization is presently distributing fuel to all areas of the kingdom, and is performing the service of supplying aircraft with fuel at the airports of Riyadh, Dhahran, al-Qaysumah, Badanah, and Tarif. In addition, it is marketing lubricating oil and ship fuel at the port of al-Dammam, petroleum gas in Ra's Tannurah, and road asphalt in Riyadh.

He added that PETROMIN now owns 19 distribution facilities in consumption areas in the different parts of the kingdom. It also owns a fleet of 320 tankers to transport petroleum products, and uses 120 railroad cars to transport oil into the central region, in addition to trucks from local contractors.

At the conclusion of his statement, PETROMIN's marketing director stated that 85 percent of the workers in the organization are Saudis, and distribution facilities operate 24 hours a day.

8591

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

WELL, PIPELINE MAINTENANCE--PETROMIN has begun implementing a project involving complete maintenance of oil pipelines in the al-Sharqiyah area and replacement of large portions of the existing network. This was announced in a statement by a responsible source in the organization, who said that PETROMIN has signed a contract worth over 300 million riyals with a company specializing in this field. The source added that this is part of an integrated project to provide maintenance and fire protection for oil wells as well as transport lines and large storage tanks. The source said that rigorous and constant observation and monitoring are carried out to obviate any accidents which might occur. The source mentioned that the safety of the oil wells and of the transportation and distribution network in the kingdom is good, and that the system is unprecedented in the world with respect to its low incidence and degree of seriousness of accidents. [Text]
[Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 11 Oct 79 p 2] 8591

CSO: 4802

KHARTOUM SEEKS BIG WESTERN LOAN

Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Oct 79 p 4

[Text]

Sudan is seeking some \$1.2 billion in loans to refinance its overdue commercial foreign debts and has asked Western bankers for concessionary terms, according to reports from London last week. The bankers, who are holders of Sudanese debts, were understood to be planning meetings in October to decide how they will respond to the request. Sudan asked for the loan at a meeting with its creditors in London at the end of last month. Khartoum asked for concessionary terms to help the country through what it expects to be a difficult period over the next few years until big new development projects begin to boost its earnings from agricultural exports. Sudan's current economic plight is due in large measure to the overheating caused by these development projects and the large volume of imports which they required.

Sudan is also due to meet the Club of Paris in November to discuss rescheduling the debts held by the Club, which is a consortium of Western export credit guarantee agencies. Commercial banks have been asked in the meantime to find out how much of Sudan's foreign debt has now passed into Club's hands as the result of export guarantee agreements.

According to the report, Sudan is asking the bankers to structure the refinancing loan to take into account its debt-servicing schedule and to include repayments of interest on principal from now until June 30, 1982, when a three-year agreement on economic reforms with the IMF comes to an end. Sudan is also reported to be seeking additional cash to help finance imports and development projects during this period.

Western bankers are understood to be sympathetic, if only because they do not want to see Sudan declare a formal default on its debts. They are expected however to balk over the terms Khartoum is seeking. Meanwhile, they can draw some comfort from

the liberalisation measures which Sudan introduced last month (*Al-Nahar Arab Report & MIM*) of September 10), which Finance Minister Badr al-Din Suleiman says are working well. The measures include a two-tier exchange rate and regulations which permit Sudanese to open accounts in local banks denominated in foreign currencies and are designed to channel

remittances from Sudanese expatriate workers into the domestic banking system. Mr Suleiman, who was in London last week, said that imports were now being financed from remittances. "The aim of the new system is to give our creditors the confidence that we will be able to honour any rescheduling," Mr Suleiman declared.

CS0: 4820

BRIEFS

ARAB MONETARY FUND LOAN--The Arab Monetary Fund has agreed to lend Sudan \$44 million to help offset its severe balance of payments deficit. The loan is the largest made by the AMF and brings Sudan's total borrowing from the Fund to \$58.6 million. The new loan is in the form of an extended fund facility similar to the three-year facility provided to Sudan by the IMF last May (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, May 14). Reports from Abu Dhabi, where the AMF is based, said that the tough measures adopted by the Sudanese government on the insistence of the IMF have improved the country's standing with international lenders. As this newsletter reported in its October 22 issue, the European Economic Community and the World Bank are considering loans totalling about \$50 million to subsidise Sudanese imports of pesticides, fuel and spare parts for farmers. Sudan's chronic balance of payments ills nevertheless made necessary a further devaluation of the pound this month, and Sudan is hoping for a massive \$1.2 billion from the West to help overcome its difficulties. The AMF has now paid out about \$90 million in loans to Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Mauritania and Syria. The latest Sudanese loan was announced early this month. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Oct 79 p 3]

CSO: 4820

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES--A number of people are using their good offices to resolve the strained relations between Shaykh Rashid Ibn Sa'id, the ruler of Dubai and prime minister of the UAE, and UAE Foreign Minister Ahmad al-Suwaydi, who has been living in seclusion in Europe. The estrangement between the two men developed on the eve of the formation of the new cabinet, when al-Suwaydi learned through the grapevine that Shaykh Rashid has privately berated him and criticized him for worsening the relations between Shaykh Rashid and the UAE head of state, Shaykh Zayid. As a result, al-Suwaydi decided that under the circumstances cooperation between him and Shaykh Rashid would be difficult, so he flew to Europe and failed to participate in the swearing in of the new cabinet. Shaykh Zayid has worked hard to sooth the feeling of the person who was his right hand man, and he took him along with him on his recent visit to Morocco. Al-Suwaydi, however, still remains in seclusion in Europe while friends are trying to complete the endeavors which were begun by Shaykh Zayid. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 19 Oct 79 p 13] 9254

CSO: 4802

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

Dec. 6 1979

TL